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[N]aval warfare alone [with Great Britain] is entirely manageable for Spain … But it is necessary to do it well: not to be side-tracked by expeditions, attempting to seize or recapture [territory]. This is the main point: to aim carefully and to fire only at the target that is the foundation of her pride … her navy and her commerce, which are one and the same.
Vice Admiral José de Mazarredo, 1795
In this tribute to Professor Hattendorf, a renowned expert in naval strategy, it seems fitting to offer an analysis of a little-known aspect in the history of the Spanish Navy in the eighteenth century: its offensive strategy. The common perception of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain and her colonial empire during this period is that it was always on the defensive, pressured by the double leviathan of the French Army and the British Navy. According to this conventional perception, Spain focused its energies on a traditional active defence of the status quo, aimed at securing communications and protecting its trade monopoly with Spanish America, in addition to sustaining its far-flung possessions overseas. This strategy forced its enemies – the French, Dutch and British – into expending a great deal of effort to turn the tide. Moreover, throughout the eighteenth century, the superiority of the British – Spain's principal rival at the time – in naval warfare and seamanship, and in commerce, manufacturing, technology and finance, had forced Spanish political and naval leaders to emphasise a defensive strategy. It truly was suicide to go looking for battle in the absence of superiority, or at least parity, of force. It was playing into the hands of the enemy. Spain's defensive stance, moreover, benefited from the line of battle, which meant that both opponents could not overpower each other, and was especially detrimental to the interests of Great Britain.
But this is only part of the picture. As is well known, strategy is the art of the dialectics of force, of opposing interests. It is also the art of creating, maintaining and regaining power.
This book presents a wide range of new research on many aspects of naval strategy in the early modern and modern periods. Among the themes covered are the problems of naval manpower, the nature of naval leadership and naval officers, intelligence, naval training and education, and strategic thinking and planning. The book is notable for giving extensive consideration to navies other than those ofBritain, its empire and the United States. It explores a number of fascinating subjects including how financial difficulties frustrated the attempts by Louis XIV's ministers to build a strong navy; how the absence of centralised power in the Dutch Republic had important consequences for Dutch naval power; how Hitler's relationship with his admirals severely affected German naval strategy during the Second World War; and many more besides. The book is a Festschrift in honour of John B. Hattendorf, for more than thirty years Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the US Naval War College and an influential figure in naval affairs worldwide.
N.A.M. Rodger is Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford.
J. Ross Dancy is Assistant Professor of Military History at Sam Houston State University.
Benjamin Darnell is a D.Phil. candidate at New College, Oxford.
Evan Wilson is Caird Senior Research Fellow at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
Contributors: Tim Benbow, Peter John Brobst, Jaap R. Bruijn, Olivier Chaline, J. Ross Dancy, Benjamin Darnell, James Goldrick, Agustín Guimerá, Paul Kennedy, Keizo Kitagawa, Roger Knight, Andrew D. Lambert, George C. Peden, Carla Rahn Phillips, Werner Rahn, Paul M. Ramsey, Duncan Redford, N.A.M. Rodger, Jakob Seerup, Matthew S. Seligmann, Geoffrey Till, Evan Wilson